

NOTES ON ARISTOPHES' WASPS

- (1) Ξα. οἴμοι, τί δῆτά μοι κακὸν γενήσεται
ιδόντι τοιοῦτον ἐνύπνιον;
Σω. μὴ φροντίσης·
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσται δεινόν, οὐ μὰ τοὺς θεούς.
Ξα. δεινόν γέ πού 'στ' ἄνθρωπος ἀποβαλὼν ὄπλα.
ἀτὰρ σὺ τὸ σὸν αὖ λέξον.
Σω. ἀλλ' ἔστω μέγα. 28

An ambiguity in this passage appears to have gone unnoticed. The ambiguity in line 27 (ὄπλα = 'arms' or 'genitals') is well known; and when Xanthias at once continues 'But you tell me about yours', many a listener might well not immediately realize that the noun to be supplied was ἐνύπνιον from 25 rather than ὄπλον from 27, and might therefore momentarily suppose that Xanthias was saying 'Tell me about your penis'; a supposition that would be temporarily confirmed when Sosias replied 'It's a big one'. The reaction of such a listener would be the same as that of Kalonike at *Lys.* 23. She has been told (14) that the women have been summoned to deliberate οὐ περὶ φαύλου πράγματος. Now she asks τί τὸ πρᾶγμα; πηλίκον τι; and on receiving the answer μέγα at once jumps to the conclusion that Lysistrata is using πρᾶγμα in its phallic sense¹ and asks μῶν καὶ παχύ;²

- (2) εἴτ' οὐκ ἐγὼ δούς δὴ ὀβολῷ μισθώσομαι
οὕτως ὑποκρινόμενον σαφῶς ὀνειράτα; 53
σαφῶς RV: σαφῶς recc.

MacDowell³ prints σαφῶς, commenting 'the quality which Xanthias claimed for his reply was clarity (50), not subtlety or skill'. But Sosias is here giving his reason for wanting to hire Xanthias as a paid interpreter of dreams; and the quality for which one pays people to interpret dreams is not clarity (which any fool can achieve) but the skill needed to discover the correct interpretation. It follows that σαφῶς is the correct reading.

- (3) ἀτὰρ οὐκ ἐσερρήσεις γε; ποῦ 'σθ' ἡ τηλία; 147

οὐκ ἐ(ι)σερρήσεις V recc.: οὐκ ερρήσεις R: οὐ τι χαίρῃσεις Wilamowitz: οὐ κάτω ῥρήσεις Bachmann: fort. οὐ κατερρήσεις.

Philokleon is trying to climb out through the smoke-hole; Bdelykleon is trying to force him back down inside. The objection to the reading ἐσερρήσεις has been pungently expressed by C. Austin,⁴ though the support given to ἐσ- by the

¹ For which see J. J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (New Haven and London, 1975), p.116.

² This passage of *Wasps* tells neither for nor against W. M. Calder's contention (*CP* 65 (1970), 257; cf. M. Marcovich's reply and Calder's rejoinder, *CP* 66 (1971), 262) that μέγας can be used of a person to mean 'having a big penis'—though I have

not seen any convincing evidence that this sense ever existed. See now R. Renehan, *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen, 1976), pp.92–8.

³ *Aristophanes: Wasps*, ed. D. M. MacDowell (Oxford, 1971).

⁴ In his review of MacDowell's edition, *CR* 23 (1973), 133.

scholia¹ indicates that it is more than a medieval stopgap, and not much should therefore be made of its omission by R. There is no cause to suspect the verb stem, ἔρρω being used here, exactly as in *Eq.* 4 and *Thesm.* 1075, to mean 'go' and simultaneously to convey a malediction on the subject; and if ἐσ- is wrong the only question is what prefix (or perhaps adverb) is right. Since Bdelykleon is trying to get his father *down* inside the house, κάτω or κατ- seems best, giving the meaning 'get down, blast you!' The verb κατέρρω, though a hapax, would be as easily understandable as εἰσέρρω (which is not found elsewhere before Agathias) in the other passages referred to; and οὐ κατερρήσεις is closer than any other plausible conjecture to the manuscripts' readings. The corruption may have started from a mistaken word-division οὐκ ατερρήσεις, followed by a logical but erroneous 'correction' of the meaningless ατερρήσεις.

(4) ὦ ξυνδικασταὶ καὶ Κλέων, ἀμύνετε. 197

Twice in the play, here and at 409, Kleon is summoned to the defence of a juror or jurors in distress, and each time he fails to appear. Part of the point of this may reside in the events obscurely referred to in 1284–91, where we learn that at some time (presumably subsequent to *Knights*) Kleon made a verbal attack or attacks on Aristophanes, in reply to which Aristophanes spoke or acted in a way that made people think he had come to terms with Kleon (1284) when in fact he had not. It is not clear when these events occurred, though it is arguable that it was after the original production of *Clouds* at the City Dionysia of 423, since no one could imagine that the writer of *Nu.* 581–94 (which belong to the original version of the play) had been reconciled to Kleon. At any rate, there was some public expectation before the Lenaia of 422 that Aristophanes would be gentler with Kleon this time. As early as 31–41, where Kleon is portrayed as a whale, it will have become evident that there was really no reconciliation, and even more so (despite the disclaimer in 62–3) when the names of the principal characters were announced at 133–4; and some of the audience may well have thought that once again, as in *Knights*, Aristophanes was building up to a personal appearance of Kleon on stage. He tantalizes them: twice Kleon is summoned, and twice he does not come, and the main issue of the play is settled without him; and then, to everybody's utter surprise, Kleon appears after all—as a dog. In *Knights* he had been a barbarian slave; one cannot go lower than that and remain human, so Kleon must join the brutes and become a whale or a hound or (1029–35) a fabulous monster.

(5) Lines 266–89 are transposed by Srebrny² to follow 316, and MacDowell finds this arrangement attractive; but it is unworkable. The chorus have entered, led by boys with lamps, through one of the eisodoi; at 270³ they *stop* and prepare to sing (ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ στάντας ἐνθάδ', ὦνδρες, ἔδοντας αὐτὸν ἐκκαλεῖν); the song follows (273–89), and at 290 they order the boys to *move on* (ὑπαγ', ὦ παῖ, ὑπαγε). They cannot start before they have stopped, and therefore 270 must come before 290 in the text. The only way to save Srebrny's transposition would be to transpose not 266–89 but 266–90; this however would leave 291 directly following the old men's reflections on the weather in 259–65, and the οὖν in 291 would have nothing to refer to.

¹ οὐκ εἰσελεύσει μετὰ φθορᾶς (R, which continually omits or abridges scholia, has the first two words only).

² *Eos* 50 (1959–60), 43–5.

³ Not at 259 (as G. Mastromarco, *Storia di una commedia di Atene* (Florence, 1974), pp. 74–5), which would leave them in the middle of a mud-patch.

There is no real objection to the traditional order. The chorus sing their aubade to Philokleon; after it they pause (between 289 and 290); there is no response, so they decide Philokleon is not coming and give the word to move off (they have to be in court early, 242). But one of the boys says 'Then (οὐν)', sc. if you want me to continue guiding you, 'will you give me a little something if I ask you?', and, asked to specify the something, demands figs and refuses to budge until he is promised some. His father convinces him that he cannot afford such 'luxury', and the chorus are just about to leave the orchestra when Philokleon at last appears. The delay between the song and Philokleon's reply, though unrealistic, would not worry Aristophanes or his audience; it is no odder than *Ach.* 781–96, where Dikaïopolis and the Megarian who is cheating him conspire together to get the maximum of laughter out of the double meaning of *χοῖρος*.¹ The amoibaion 291–316 gives the audience a chance to hear the boy singer, and the author a chance to re-emphasize the poverty of the old men and to make the point that they depend for their livelihood on a constant and ample supply of lawsuits (303–6); and this is quite sufficient justification for its existence.

One further consideration is relevant. We have twice been told that the old jurors like singing the melodies of Phrynichos the tragedian (220, 269); it is accordingly a fair inference that the metre and music of 273–316 are based on Phrynichean models.² As the text stands, we have a strophic pair in which the chorus call Philokleon out of his house in a Phrynichean strain, exactly as Bdelykleon said they would (219–21), followed by another strophic pair (291–316) to which the metre is much less appropriate. It would be odd if this unforeshadowed ionic ode preceded the foreshadowed one; odd if the first *ἀρχαιομελίσδιωνοφρυνιχῆρατον* utterance was ‘Move on, boy, move on’; and oddest of all if the Phrynichean strain were initiated by the boys instead of the old men. Yet if we transpose, the first of these undesirable consequences is bound to ensue, together with either the second or the third.

(6) *νῦν ἐκεῖνο νῦν ἐκεῖνο*
τοῦξύθιμον, ᾧ κολαζόμεσθα, κέντρον
ἐντέτατ' ὀξύ. 407

407 ita codd.: ἐντατέ' ὀξύ Willems: ἐντέταται ὀξύ Hermann: ἐντέταται ὀξέως Bergk: fort. ἐντέταται <εἰς μάχην>.

The metre is uncertain, but the acatalectic period-close is suspicious,³ particularly as the period 463–5, which is in rough correspondence with this one, ends catalectically. In addition, ὀξύ is hard to defend. Placed as it is, it can only be predicative, and must therefore (*pace* MacDowell) imply that the sting, though

¹ See the masterly discussion of the *Acharnians* passage by K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (London, 1972), pp.63–5.

¹² The metre is predominantly ionic; this metre, used in Aeschylus' *Persians* (65–114) 'like the Oriental robes to reinforce the impression of an un-Greek culture and code of behaviour' (A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*² (Cambridge, 1968), p. 124), may well have been used in Phrynichos'.

Phoinissai for the same purpose, and it is specifically from *Phoinissai* that the jurors' melodies come, for they are 'Sidonian' (220). The very scanty fragments of that play contain no ionics, but Phrynichos is known to have used the metre (fr. 14 Nauck).

³ Cf. Dale, *Lyric Metres*², p.87, who asserts that the trochaic metre 'cannot run to a pause except by catalexis'; note that there is pause after 407 (there follow two tetrameters, beginning with ἀλλὰ).

now sharp, was not sharp previously—which is nonsense. Further, it is redundant, since whatever it says was said far more effectively by ὀξύθυμον. 'Since', says MacDowell, 'the sense is satisfactory and the metre not impossible, I hesitate to emend'; in fact, the sense being far from satisfactory and the metre highly dubious, we must emend—or at least recognize that there is corruption. Of all correctors only Bergk has attempted to heal all the passage's faults; his emendation gives exact correspondence with 465 (-λάβαν' ὑπιοῦσά με) and gets rid of the objectionable ὀξύ with minimum change.¹ However, it is not clear what it means for a sting to be 'sharply braced'; and if, as is quite likely, ὀξύ has wandered into the text from a note on τοῦξούθυμον, the manuscripts' reading can give us no help in recovering the original text. With an eye on the ἐντεταμένους . . . εἰς τὸ ἔργον of Xen. *Oik.* 21.9, I suggest ἐντέταται <εἰς μάχην>, 'is braced for battle'; the military tinge in these words is echoed more strongly in 422–4.

- (7) ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν οὐδέν ἀλγεῖς, ἀλλ' ὅταν ξυνήγορος
ταῦτά ταῦτά σου καταντλή καὶ ξυνωμότας καλῇ. 483

ita nugis exceptis codd., sed ξυνωμό R: ξυνωμότην Cobet et Hirschig.

MacDowell has defended ξυνωμότας καλῇ, taking it to mean 'issues a summons to conspirators'. But the context, in particular ξυνήγορος and καταντλή, evokes a prosecution speech in court, and one did not issue summonses on the day of the trial (even if καλῇ could bear this meaning anyway).² The generalizing plural ξυνωμόται is used appropriately by Bdelykleon in 488, where he is talking about the reactions of the chorus and people like them on a wide variety of occasions; it is utterly inappropriate in 483, where we are picturing a very particular occasion, the prospective trial of Bdelykleon himself. No doubt the paradosis is the reading which R, *more suo*, has preserved without troubling to determine what it means; the other manuscripts have explained the abbreviation on the basis of 488.³ We are therefore at liberty to reinterpret the abbreviation according to the demands of the context and accordingly to read καὶ ξυνωμότην καλῇ, 'and calls you a conspirator <just as we, the chorus, in effect did in 463–70 and 473–7>'.⁴

- (8) καὶ ξίφος γέ μοι δότε· 522
ἦν γὰρ ἡττηθῶ λέγων σου, περιπεσοῦμαι τῷ ξίφει.

There is no reason whatsoever to doubt that Philokleon is in fact given a sword at this point.⁵ At 166, indeed, he asked for a sword and was not given one; but that was for the sake of a momentary joke. Here the presence of the sword on stage can be traced for more than 200 lines. At 523 Philokleon vows to fall on the sword if defeated in the agon; at 654 he threatens to kill his son, a threat

¹ The same result would be achieved by ἐντατέον ὀξέως, proposed by D. M. Jones in an unpublished paper.

² The evidence that it can do so consists of καλέσῃς in 1418: very shaky evidence, considering the προσκαλοῦμαι of 1417 and the constant confusion of second-person -εις and -ει, -ης and -η, in manuscripts.

³ There is other evidence for a wandering of scribal eyes between 483 and 488: the scholion on 483 (V Ald.: om. R), ὡς αὐτῶν συνεχῶς λεγόντων ὅτι ταῦτα τυραννίς ἐστι καὶ ξυνωμοσία· οὐδέν ἄλλο, φησί, μεμελέτηται

ὁμῖν εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, would be more apposite as a note on 488, and may well originally have belonged there.

⁴ Cf. also *Eq.* 628, where Paphlagon-Kleon, in a speech to the boule, denounces the knights ξυνωμότας λέγων 'calling them conspirators' or 'using the word "conspirators"': the denunciation of Bdelykleon by the ξυνήγορος will follow the same pattern.

⁵ This note takes up and adds to the arguments already given by Austin (cf. n.4, p.261 above).

which is much more credible if he is armed; at 714 he has difficulty in holding the sword; and at 756–7, as Barrett has seen,¹ he unsuccessfully attempts to stab himself, and probably lets the sword fall. Relevant too may be the story told by Plutarch (*Arist.* 26. 3, *Nik.* 6. 1) about the suicide of Paches in court, at his *eũthunai* for his command at Mytilene. Westlake has recently argued against the authenticity of the story;² but we know that Plutarch found it, in one form or another, in several sources;³ nor can any strong inference be drawn from the silence of Diodoros, considering that he also says nothing about at least one far more important instance of the 'ingratitude' of the demos to its best leaders, namely the ostracism of Kimon. I would argue that the behaviour of Philokleon is a parody of the behaviour of Paches, and therefore that Plutarch's story about Paches and the business with the sword in *Wasps* are mutually confirmatory. For a threat of suicide if the speaker loses his case, cf. *Dem.* 57. 70.

- (9) Xo. νῦν δὴ τὸν ἐκ θήμετέρου
 γυμνασίου λέγειν τι δεῖ
 κανόν, ὅπως φανήσῃ—
 Bδ. ἐνεγκάτω μοι δεῦρο τὴν κίστην τις ὥς τάχιστα.
 ἀτὰρ φανεῖ ποῖός τις ὢν, ἣν ταῦτα παρακελεύει; 530—1
 Xo. —μὴ κατὰ τὸν νεανίαν
 τόνδε λέγειν.
 531 ἦν . . . παρακελεύῃ codd.: fort. εἰ . . . παρακελεύει
 531 ταῦτα Triclinius: ταῦτ' αὐτὰ fere RVΓVp3

Starkie was surely right to take Philokleon as the subject of 530–1 and *φανεῖ* as third person active; as he says, 'it obviously takes up *φανήσῃ*, and so the subject of the two must be the same'. But the conditional clause remains hard to understand. The meaning we expect to find is 'What will he show himself to be, if he takes your advice?'⁴ The meaning we are actually offered is, or so it seems, 'What will he show himself to be, if you give him this advice?', and this is nonsense: from the fact of an exhortation being given it by no means follows that it will be acted upon. The only possibility I see, short of emendation, of obtaining a more satisfactory sense would be to take *παρακελεύῃ* also as third person active—'what will he show himself to be, if he delivers this speech <which you are urging him to deliver>?'—but even if the active form were attested in Attic (which it is not) the verb would then not quite give an appropriate sense, since Philokleon's speech is not going to be hortatory.

Those scholars who have not emended the text in such a way as to remove the conditional clause altogether,⁵ have always, not unnaturally, assumed that it modified *φανεῖ*. There is, however, another possibility: the conditional may

¹ *Aristophanes: The Wasps, The Poet and the Women, The Frogs*, trans. David Barrett (Harmondsworth, 1964). He translates the lines thus: 'Speed, speed, my soul! [*He strikes, but the sword becomes entangled in his clothing, and then in his beard.*] Where is my soul? It must be under here. Part, part, ye shady thickets, let me pass!'

² *Phoenix* 29 (1975), 107 ff.

³ He speaks (*Arist.* l.c.) of οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες . . . ὅσοι τὰ πλημμεληθέντα τῶ δήμῳ περὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς διεξίαισι.

⁴ Barrett, indeed, succeeds in making his translation convey that meaning, by exploiting the ambiguity of the English expression 'if he's advised by you'—an ambiguity we can hardly posit for Greek.

⁵ Of emendations that do remove the conditional, the best is that of Kirchhoff, who places a question mark after ὢν and ends the line τοῦτ' αὐτὸ παρακελεύου, 'give that bit of advice!' (cf. the reading of the pre-Triclinian manuscripts).

anything else, this enables the wish $\delta\ \mu\eta\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$ to refer, as its position suggests it should,¹ to the whole phrase $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\tilde{\iota}\sigma\alpha\iota$ (= $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota$) rather than to $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\sigma\alpha\iota$ alone. But to do this (or, like Starkie, to make an emendation whose effect is the same), while leaving 536 and the punctuation unmodified, creates a new fault; for, as Rogers points out,² it is absurd to make the chorus say 'it will be a great fight if he wins': it will be a great fight in any case.

The true solution was first seen, I think, by David Barrett, though in his translation he does not note that he has emended and/or repunctuated the text. He renders the passage as follows:³

You see what you are up against: the contest will be tense,
Such mighty matters are at stake; the issues are immense.

If he should chance to beat you (which the gods forbid he should)—

BDEL. I'm going to write down every word: his speech had best be good!

PHIL. Oh, please go on: if he should win—what were you going to say?

CHO. Why, that would mean admitting that old men have had their day . . .

The crucial point is that at 538, just as at 529, Bdelykleon interrupts the chorus in the middle of a sentence, so that 540 is a direct continuation of 537 as 532 is of 528. By thus attaching the protasis 536–7 to an apodosis (540–1) which in view of Philokleon's question probably needs it, and with which it certainly does no harm, we necessarily detach it from the preceding sentence (533–5), which is better off without it: Rogers's objection no longer has force.

Other than repunctuation, this view of the passage calls for only one change in the text, and that a minor one. Conceivably $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho$, with asyndeton, might even be defensible, as the chorus proceed to specify more particularly in what way the contest is a vital one; but it is perhaps more natural to introduce $\gamma\acute{\alpha\rho}$, the usual connective in such circumstances. If once a copyist had the preconception that the chorus's words ought to constitute a complete sentence, the change of ΕΙΓΑΡ to ΕΙΠΕΡ would be almost inevitable.

(11) $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\ \gamma\acute{\alpha\rho}\ \tau\omicron\iota\ \sigma\epsilon\mu\acute{\nu}\omicron\upsilon\cdot\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\upsilon\ \omega\tilde{\nu}\ \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\rho\eta\kappa\alpha\varsigma\ \mu\alpha\kappa\alpha\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega.$ 588

$\sigma\epsilon\mu\acute{\nu}\omicron\upsilon$ cett.: $\sigma\epsilon\mu\acute{\nu}\omega\upsilon$ R: $\sigma\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\upsilon$ Reiske deletio puncto

Almost all editors have found the text intolerable here and gladly accepted Reiske's emendation. MacDowell has returned to the manuscripts' reading, taking it to refer to 578–87 as a whole; but this is surely impossible. Since Bdelykleon

Pl. *Rep.* 370 b, 375 a; the clearest cases, however, occur in Herodotos, where the periphrastic future is of frequent occurrence in conditional clauses. Cf. Hdt. 9. 89. 2: $\delta\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \text{'Αρτάβαξος γνούς ὅτι, εἰ ἔθελει σφί πᾶσαν τὴν ἀληθειὴν τῶν ἀγώνων εἰπεῖν, αὐτός τε κωδυνεύσει ἀπολέσθαι καὶ ὁ μετ' αὐτοῦ στρατός . . . πρὸς τοὺς Φωκέας ἐξηγόρευε οὐδέν.}$ Similar are Hdt. 1. 32. 3: 1. 109. 4: 2. 14. 1: 2. 99. 3: 2. 173. 4: 7. 49. 4. This periphrastic use is the ultimate ancestor of the $\theta\acute{\alpha}$ of modern Greek.

¹ When, as is the case here, the parenthetic $\delta\ \mu\eta\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$ precedes the verb which $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$ represents, the sentence is always a conditional, and the occurrence which is

deprecatd is always the same as that which is hypothesized in the protasis of the conditional (Aesch. *Seven* 5 $\epsilon\iota\ \delta'\ \alpha\tilde{\upsilon}\delta'$, $\delta\ \mu\eta\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$, $\sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\omicron\iota$: Eur. *Hkld.* 314 $\eta\upsilon\ \delta'\ \omicron\upsilon\tilde{\nu}$, $\delta\ \mu\eta\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$, $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\omega\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$: Eur. *Ion* 731 $\alpha\ \mu\eta\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron\ \delta'$, $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\ \tau\iota\ \tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$). In the present passage, the occurrence hypothesized is $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\tilde{\iota}\sigma\alpha\iota$; this therefore should also be the occurrence deprecatd.

² In the critical appendix to his edition, *ad vers.* 535.

³ I have restored the names of the characters, whom Barrett calls Anticleon and Procleon. I had arrived at the form of the text given above before I realized that Barrett's translation virtually presupposed it.

takes the trouble to make a reservation in the next line (τῆς δ' ἐπικλήρου τὴν διαθήκην ἀδικεῖς ἀνακογχυλιάζων), 588 cannot be sarcastic; and if Bdelykleon seriously meant that 578–87 as a whole was a good response to his challenge (577) to show what benefits the jurors derived from their alleged power, it would undermine a good deal of his own case. Whatever text we adopt, *τουτί* must refer to the one real advantage that Philokleon has mentioned: that jurors can do what they like without having to give any account of their actions (587). And if we retain *σεμνόν*, then *τούτων* must have the *same* reference. 'Yes, you know, that is wonderful; on that, what you've mentioned, I congratulate you.' Given this restricted reference, it affects the sense little whether *σεμνόν* or *σε μόνον* is read; neither makes absolutely plain sailing grammatically, but the omission of an easily understood object pronoun with *μακαρίζω* can be paralleled,¹ and therefore, though without much confidence, I should retain the manuscripts' reading.

(12) ὥστ' ἤδη τὴν ὀργὴν χαλάσας τοὺς σκίπωνας καταβάλλω. 727

As in the case of Philokleon's sword, MacDowell refuses to interpret these words of the chorus literally; it had usually been inferred from them that the chorus here drop their walking-sticks. He supposes a metaphor from a form of double-stick fighting (for whose existence there is no evidence); but *σκίπων* means a walking-stick or a crutch, not a cudgel (though an old man in a rage might *use* his stick as an ersatz cudgel, as in *Nu.* 541, *Pl.* 272). MacDowell's only objection to the literal interpretation is that 'καταβάλλω is singular and one member of the chorus will not be carrying more than one stick'. The use, however, of the first person singular by a chorus to refer to itself is so normal as to require no exemplification; and this sometimes leads to illogicalities at least as gross as the present one. At 1093 the chorus say 'I subdued the enemy *πλέων ἐκείσε ταῖς τριήρεσιν*', which makes sense only if 'I' is taken to refer to the chorus, or rather the oldest generation of Athenians, as a body, for any one of them will only have sailed in one ship. Compare also such a passage as Aesch. *Su.* 739 f., where Danaos in successive lines addresses his daughters as *τέκνα* and assures them that the Argives *μαχοῦνται περὶ σέ εἰς εἶν*. In addition, the discarding of the sticks has dramatic significance. Old men normally carried sticks, young men normally did not, so that throwing away one's stick can symbolize rejuvenation; and rejuvenation happens to be one of the themes of this play (as it is of *Knights*, *Peace*, and *Wealth*). In *Wasps* the theme is most memorably embodied in the person of Philokleon, but the chorus have their share in it too (they think themselves capable of acting with youthful strength and excelling their effeminate juniors, 1066–70). There is thus no reason to doubt that the chorus do indeed discard their sticks at 727, no doubt to be cleared away by theatre attendants.

(13) καὶ ταῦτα μὲν νυν εὐλόγως· ἦν δ' ἐξέχῃ
εἶλη, κατ' ὀρθὸν ἡλιάσει πρὸς ἥλιον. 772

771 δ' Starkie: om. codd., Suda.

772 ὀρθὸν γρ ΣΓ, Callistratus: ὀρθρον codd., Suda.

¹ Cf. the frequent use of ἀπολεῖς without expressed object (με being understood), e.g. *Nu.* 1499, *Eccl.* 775, *Pl.* 390.

Those editors who do not insert δ' punctuate these two lines as a single sentence, with only a comma after εὐλόγως; this, as Starkie saw, produces a false antithesis between ταῦτα and ἐὰν νείρῃ in 773. His insertion of δ' yields a much more satisfactory antithesis between two different kinds of advantage of Bdelykleon's proposal that his father should judge at home: (i) that he can convict and punish there just as well as he can in court (767–70), (ii) that he can choose a convenient place and time to hear cases according to the state of the weather and of his inclinations (771–5). Thus the first part of 771 summarizes the preceding four lines; the use of καὶ ταῦτα μὲν almost signals a summary (cf. *Ach.* 523, *Pl.* 8). The meaning is 'in that respect things are entirely logical'; for ταῦτα 'in that respect' cf. *Lys.* 91 f., *Ra.* 703, *Eur. Ba.* 655 f.; for the ellipse of ἔχει with an adverb cf. *Eq.* 101, *V.* 856, *Ra.* 508, 512, 532, *Eccl.* 875.¹

The persistence of ὀρθρον in the editions is remarkable. The meaning of εἴλη is 'the heat of the sun's rays'; this is clear from Hesychios, who thrice defines a word which must be φέλα as 'ray of the sun' or the like,² as well as from *Ar. fr.* 627, which speaks of fish roasted πρὸς εἴλην; further confirmation is provided by the etymology of the word, for it is cognate with English *swelter*.³ And the heat of the sun's rays is not to be felt κατ' ὀρθρον; for in Attic⁴ ὀρθρος is the period when day is approaching but it is still too dark to see properly, and is accordingly reckoned as part of the night.⁵ Even if (wrongly) the meaning of εἴλη is toned down to 'warmth', it is not the case that a high temperature before daybreak indicates that a sunny day is likely—in fact, the clearer the sky, other things being equal, the cooler it will be at that time. The variant κατ' ὀρθόν, in addition to its other merits (for which see Starkie and MacDowell, neither of whom however prints it), pairs neatly with εὐλόγως: 'In that respect things are logical enough; and again, if it's a warm sunny day, you can with the same logical propriety have your court in the courtyard' (or however one represents the pun). For κατ' ὀρθόν 'with (logical or linguistic) propriety' cf. *Pl. Tim.* 44 b.

¹ M. Platnauer (*CQ* 3 (1953), 54) criticizes Starkie's text and punctuation on the ground that it 'makes Bdelycleon approve of his father's imposition of small fines . . . , which is the last thing he would do'. Actually he does not so much approve of it as say it is logical; which is the least he could do, considering that the imposition of small fines is his own suggestion (769).

² The entries are: (i) γ 285 γέλαν· αὐγῇν ἡλιού
(ii) γ 290 γέλας· ἀγῆας
(iii) β 476 βέλα· ἡλιος
(καὶ αὐγῇ) (ὅπου
Λακωνῶν add. S).

³ See J. Pokorny, *Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern, 1959), 1045.

⁴ Herodotos, by contrast, seems to reckon ὀρθρος as part of the day and to mean by it the first part of the morning from daybreak to πλήθουσα ἀγορή: see *Hdt.* 2. 173. 1; 4. 181. 3; 7. 188. 2.

⁵ Thus ὀρθρος is the time of cockcrow

(*Ar. Av.* 489, 496; *Eccl.* 741); it is too dark to see people (*Thuc.* 3. 112. 3–4) unless they carry lanterns (*Ar. Eccl.* 20–9); people are normally in bed (*Ar. Ach.* 256, *Lys.* 966), including even soldiers in camp (*Thuc.* loc. cit.); the nightingale sings then (*Eur. Phaethon* 69 Diggle); cf. also *Ar. Eccl.* 283, 290 (ὀρθροῖς = πρὶ πάντων τοῦ κνέφους), *Thuc.* 5. 58. 4 with Andrewes's note (ὀρθριον contrasted with ἡμέρας ἡδης), *Thuc.* 6. 101. 3 (περὶ ὀρθρον earlier than ἡμα ἔω). Phrynichos *Ekl.* 341 notes that in his time ὀρθρος was commonly used to mean the time before sunrise and says that to 'the ancients' (i.e. the Attic writers) it meant 'the time before daybreak, when one can still use a lamp: what the many wrongly call ὀρθρος was called ἔως by the ancients'. The evidence leaves no doubt that he was right. Cf. also Phryn. *Sophistic Preparation* 93. 13–94. 8 Borries. I am grateful to John Chadwick for prompting me to make certain of the meaning of ὀρθρος.

(14) 'ταχὺ γοῦν καθέψεις τὰργύριον,' ἥ δ' ὅς λέγων.

The unique use of καθέψεις as = 'digest' has been a stumbling-block to many editors, and it was surely rather a straining of language on Aristophanes' part: καταπέττεις would rather have been expected.¹ As often when he strains language, he may have done so in the interests of a pun. In Latin, the verb *decoquo*, whose literal sense is the same as that of καθέψω, has come to mean, first 'waste (money)', then 'ruin (someone financially)', and finally 'become insolvent'; could καθέψω have acquired a similar meaning in colloquial Attic? If it had, this reproach is a suitably absurd one for Lysistratos to utter, since he never had any money himself (*Ach.* 856–9, *Eq.* 1267–73) yet belonged to social circles that must have been expensive to move in (in *Wasps* 1302–13 he appears at Philokleon's dinner-party, and in real life he took part in the mutilation of the Hermai).

(15) In 851–62 MacDowell, following J. C. B. Lowe,² rightly takes it to be Bdelykleon who notices the absence of voting-urns and water-clock, and Philokleon who improvises substitutes. An obvious objection, which some may feel Lowe did not adequately rebut, is that in 818–30 it is Philokleon who notices the absence of various pieces of courtroom equipment. There is, however, an essential difference between the desiderata in that passage and in this. In 818–30 the missing items are the heroon of Lykos (819) and a railing, 'the first of the sacred objects to be revealed to us' (830–1): both are part of Philokleon's beloved lawcourt environment (386, 389–94) and evidently for him a court cannot really be a court without them, but neither is actually needed for the proper conduct of a case. In 848–57, on the other hand, the missing items are genuine court requisites: notice-boards and notices, voting-urns, a water-clock. It is thus appropriate that it should be the practical-minded Bdelykleon who thinks of them, and the ingenious Philokleon (cf. 143–210 and the improvised δρύρακτος of 844) who finds substitutes for some of them. Bdelykleon sees a court as a place for the administration of justice; Philokleon sees it partly as his spiritual home (his son regards him as suffering from φιλοχωρία, 834) and partly as a place where he can do unlimited harm without responsibility (106, 278–80, 322, 340, 561, 584–7, etc.; after he gives up judging, doing harm with impunity remains his chief joy—cf. 1263, 1335–40, etc.).

(16) In line 903 the prosecuting dog barks to indicate that he is present in court, and then someone says of him:

ἕτερος οὗτος αὖ Λάβης,
ἀγαθός γ' ὑλακτεῦν καὶ διαλείχων τὰς χύτρας.

Who says this? MacDowell, following Coulon³ and Lowe,⁴ gives it to Philokleon, 'for whom the cynical sarcasm is in character'; but in relation to this dog Philokleon is anything but cynical and sarcastic—on the contrary, he swallows every word the dog says.⁵ If Philokleon is to retain this speech, it must be con-

¹ It was conjectured by van Leeuwen.

² *Hermes* 95 (1967), 53–6.

³ *REG* 49 (1936), 408 n.5.

⁴ *Hermes* 95 (1967), 59–63.

⁵ The same objection applies with even more force to the proposal of Wilamowitz (*Sitzungsb. Preuss. Ak. Wiss.* (1911), 519 = *Kl. Schr.* i. 338), accepted by Coulon in his

edition, to give ἀγαθός γ' ὑλακτεῦν to Bdelykleon and the preceding and following clauses to Philokleon, thus taking away from Philokleon the only clause that can be taken in a sense favourable to the Kleon-dog. Lowe defends his attribution of 903b–904 to Philokleon by comparing 596, but 596 is not disparaging (as MacDowell says 'shouting is

verted into a compliment to the dog, which (as MacDowell notes apropos of Barrett's translation) requires arbitrary emendation of the text. There is, as Rogers saw,¹ one person and one only to whom this line and a half are suited: the slave (probably Xanthias) who originally reported the theft of the cheese (835–42). Xanthias, as we know from that passage, has no high opinion of Labes; and as he is throughout the play (like the slaves of Old Comedy generally) a relatively sane character, it is not surprising to find him disparaging the prosecuting dog (who represents Kleon) as well.² Four actors are thus required in this scene; but four actors are required in the play anyway, because of 1412–17, where on the exit of the bread-seller Myrtia another character is seen approaching without any interval while Bdelykleon and Philokleon are both on stage.³ Xanthias will have led the dogs into 'court' between 898 and 899, as he was instructed to do at 843; Bdelykleon, as herald, tells him to be quiet and sit down (905), and Xanthias accordingly sits down outside the railing, a one-man courtroom audience just as Philkleon is a one-man jury, while Bdelykleon instructs the prosecuting dog to begin his speech.

(17) ψησὶν τε μετ' αὐτὸν
 τοῖς ἡπιάλοις ἐπιχειρῆσαι πέρυσιν καὶ τοῖς πυρετοῖσιν,
 οἳ τοὺς πατέρας τ' ἤγχον νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον,
 κατακλινόμενοι τ' ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπράγμοσιν
ὑμῶν 1040
 ἀντωμοσίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων,
 ὥστ' ἀναπηδᾶν δευμαίνοντας πολλοὺς ὥς τὸν πολέμαρχον.

1037 αὐτὸν Bentley: αὐτοῦ codd.

It is perhaps excessive to say, with MacDowell (and indeed most editors), that 'Ar.'s statement that Athenians afflicted by *συκοφάνται* rush to the polemarchos is evidence that many *συκοφάνται* were not citizens but metics'. Such evidence would be highly valuable, since we have no other evidence that metics could initiate legal proceedings in person in the fifth century⁴ unless they were

regarded by Philokleon as a merit') whereas 903b–904 is; nor is the implication of 758–9 that Kleon is a thief decisive: Philokleon was then in a distraught state; now he has recovered his composure, his devotion to Kleon, and his determination to convict every defendant, as is made quite clear by his attitude throughout the trial scene and his collapse (995) when he realizes he has been tricked into acquitting Labes.

¹ In his commentary ad loc.: 'The observation which follows is given by some to Bdelykleon, and by others to Philokleon, but seems rather to be a saucy interpellation of Xanthias.'

² For what it is worth, Xanthias at the start of the play cordially detests the real Kleon (38, 41, 62–3).

³ Ignoring the parts of children, and of barbarians with only a line or two to speak (cf. K. J. Dover, *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford, 1968), p.lxxviii), there are at least

four other Aristophanic plays in which four actors are required: *Acharnians* 129 ff. (Dikaiopolis, Herald, Amphiheos' exit directly followed by Theoros' entrance); *Clouds* 889–1104 (Strepsiades, Pheidippides, and the two Logoi); *Lysistrata* 81–244 (Lysistrata, Kalonike, Myrrhine, Lampito) and probably also 439 ff.; *Frogs* 549–78 (Dionysos, Xanthias, and the two innkeepers) and 1414–81 (Dionysos, Aeschylus, Euripides, and Pluto who may well have been a silent presence since 830). In the present scene, since the parts of Philokleon, Bdelykleon, and Xanthias are major ones running right through the play, the fourth actor will presumably have had the part of the dog; this amounts to fifteen and a half lines—a good deal shorter than the part of Lampito, to say nothing of the two Logoi in *Clouds*.

⁴ See J. H. Lipsius, *Die attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* (Leipzig, 1905–15), pp.370–3, 791–3.

ἰσοτελεῖς;¹ but it is not provided by the present passage. What the present passage proves is that in the play to which it refers, produced in 423 (πέρυσον), Aristophanes *accused* certain *συκοφάνται* of not being citizens—an accusation which is part of his normal vocabulary of abuse. This perhaps slightly reinforces the case for the widely accepted view that the play in question was *Holkades*; for in Ar. fr. 411, from *Holkades*, Euathlos is called a *τοξότης*, that is a Scythian (cf. *Ach.* 703–12), and Euathlos, whom we know from the passage of *Acharnians* just referred to as the (or a) prosecutor of Thucydides son of Melesias, would fit well the description given in V. 1038–42: in particular the implication of 1039 that the *συκοφάνται* complained of attack mainly old men corresponds to the description of the aged and speechless Thucydides overwhelmed by Euathlos in the *Acharnians* passage. It was a scene that Aristophanes did not forget in a hurry (cf. V. 946–8).

(18) ἄρα δευὸς ἦ τόθ', ὥστε πάντα μὴ δεδοκέναί. 1091

sic fere codd.: πάντα μ' ἂν Dobree: πάντας ἐμέ Hirschig.

I do not know of any evidence that πάντα μὴ δεδοκέναί can mean 'to fear nothing', or, indeed, that it can mean anything at all; and in any case 'to fear nothing' is not the sense the context requires. For there is no necessary inference from being *δευός* to being fearless: a *δευός* person may or may not fear, what matters is that he is feared. Dobree's emendation, 'so that absolutely anyone would have feared me' (for this use of πᾶς ἂν cf. 348, Eur. *Hipp.* 519), is the simplest; the corruption probably began with μ' ἂν being read as one word and then consciously or unconsciously 'corrected' to μὴν, which in turn was changed to μὴ in the supposed interests of the sense.

(19) πόθεν, ὦ γάθ'; 1145

It is worth while charting the various ways in which, during the play, Bdelykleon addresses his father. In 144 and 184 he pretends not to know who his father is, and otherwise throughout that scene uses no form of address to him. When next he addresses Philokleon, at 397, it is as ὦ *μιαρώτατε*, and two lines later he orders Philokleon to be beaten. From 519, when he is seeking to win his father over, he becomes more respectful; during and after the agon he regularly calls Philokleon 'father' (519, 667, 760, 919, 975, 988, 995, 1003) or a hypocoristic substitute (655, 986); thrice also (962, 967, 988) he calls him ὦ *δαμόνιε*. This last form of address is said by Wendel² to be capable 'within the same piece of expressing now blame, now admiration, now horror, now astonishment, now contempt, now friendship', which would scarcely entitle us to ascribe any definite connotations to it; but an examination of its use in Aristophanes shows clearly that his characters employ this form of address in rebuking, admonishing, or pleading with a respected person, always with an element of deference. The one occasion on which a free man uses it to a slave (*Thesm.* 64) is in the strict sense an exception proving the rule; for Agathon's servant responds by treating Euripides as one begging a favour (he replies *μηδὲν ἐκέτευε*).³ Thus up to the

¹ Complaints about ἰσοτελεῖς would likewise be made to the polemarch (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 58. 2).

² T. Wendel, *Die Gesprächsanrede im griechischen Epos und Drama der Blütezeit* (Stuttgart, 1929), p. 108.

³ Otherwise in Aristophanes it is used in

addressing a father (*Nu.* 38, 816, before Pheidippides receives his sophistic education), a brother (*Ra.* 44), a wife (*Lys.* 883, 945), a neighbour (*Eccl.* 564, 784), a creditor (*Nu.* 1138), the audience (*V.* 1052, in an appeal for their favour); Paphlagon uses it to Demos when insisting that he is Demos 'best

parabasis Bdelykleon remains respectful to his father. But as soon as Philokleon has abandoned judging, Bdelykleon is less careful in his manner of address: ὦγαθέ (1145, 1149, 1152) is a form of address bearing no particular connotations, which one can use to anybody, respected or not;¹ and ὦ τᾶν (1161) tends to involve an assumption of superiority and often to imply that the addressee is a little stupid²—it is not the way to address one's father, unless, like Pheidippides (*Nu.* 1432), one is rejecting the normal social constraints. By 1183 Bdelykleon has got as far as ὦ σκαίε καπαίδευτε, which on second thoughts he seems to realize is a bit extreme, and converts from a form of address into a joke about Theogenes. It is nothing, though, to ὦ οὗτος οὗτος, τυρεδανὲ καὶ χοιρόθλιψ (1364), which is the sole form of address used by Bdelykleon to his father in the last 350 lines of the play. The movement in Bdelykleon's attitude thus seems to be parabolic, as it were, first an increase and then a decrease in respectfulness; it corresponds to the fact that at the beginning and end of the play Bdelykleon tries to restrain his father forcibly (with success at the beginning, without success at the end), and in the middle to win him over by persuasion; it corresponds too to the fact that Philokleon is more or less mad at the beginning and end of the play and relatively sane in the middle.

(20) Theogenes is said by the scholia on 1183 to have been of Acharnai (likewise *Lys.* 61 ff. with scholia³); but schol. *Pax.* 928 and probably schol. *Av.* 822 say he was of Peiraeus.⁴ MacDowell⁵ holds that Peiraeus was his deme and Acharnai his residence; but the only evidence for this is the conjectural identification of this Theogenes with the Theogenes who was later one of the Thirty, and who probably belonged to the tribe Hippothontis, which included the deme Peiraeus but not Acharnai.⁶ In view of the fact that the Theogenes satirized by

friend' (*Eq.* 860), two men seeking gifts use it to the ruler of Cloudcuckoo-ville (*Av.* 961, 1436), Herakles to his uncle Poseidon (*Av.* 1638), Lysistrata in rallying her wavering comrades (*Lys.* 762), Dionysos to the Corpse when trying to hire him/it as porter (*Ra.* 175) and to Euripides while still apparently feeling favourable to him (*Ra.* 835, 1227; note how in 1228 Dionysos identifies himself, for the moment, with Euripides' cause by speaking of 'our prologues').

¹ Cf. Wendel, *Gesprächsanrede*, p. 106. Examples of its non-respectful use in Aristophanes are *Eq.* 722, 843; *Pax* 1238; *Av.* 846; *Pl.* 360.

² Typical uses are *Pax* 721 (explanatory, god to mortal); *Lys.* 501 (Lysistrata has the whip-hand, and treats the Proboulos as a troublesome pupil); *Lys.* 1178 (Lysistrata ought to know better than to suppose that the allies' attitude can possibly be in doubt); *Pl.* 377 (an honest friend wishing to help a supposedly dishonest friend in trouble). Apart from *Pl.* 66 (where the assignment of ὦ τᾶν and its point are alike doubtful) the only Aristophanic passages where ὦ τᾶν is used without apparent assumption of

superiority on the part of the user are *V.* 373, *Av.* 12 (a curse), and *Ra.* 1243 (where Euripides appears impatient with Dionysos' buffooning interruption). Wendel, *Gesprächsanrede*, p. 116, cites *Eq.* 1036 as showing that ὦ τᾶν can be used by a social inferior to a superior; but its use there may very well be intended to suggest that Kleon, though affecting to love and serve the people, in reality despised them (cf. *V.* 666, where Bdelykleon makes the same suggestion by slipping the word κολοσυρτός into an imaginary politician's protestation of loyalty to the people).

³ Aristophanes implies, and the scholiasts on *Wasps* and *Lys.* state, that Theogenes was an Ἀχαρνεύς; this does not entail that he lived at Acharnai, and no ancient source says he did.

⁴ The former uses the expression ἐκ Πειραιῶς; in schol. *Av.* 822 the impossible περαιῆτης of the tradition is emended by MacDowell to Πειραιεύς, but Πειραιῆτης (which is not a demotic) is a less drastic alteration.

⁵ *RbM* 104 (1961), 229–36.

⁶ MacDowell, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

Aristophanes made himself out to be a big importer,¹ Peiraeus would seem a much more likely place than Acharnai for him to live; and as I show in nn.3–4, p.273, Aristophanes and his scholiasts designate Theogenes by the demotic derived from Acharnai (three times) but not, if manuscript authority is worth anything, by that derived from Peiraeus. I therefore suggest that the Theogenes of *Wasps*, *Peace*, *Birds*, and *Lysistrata* was a member of the deme Acharnai living at Peiraeus, and therefore probably distinct from the Theogenes who was one of the Thirty. He may well, as was formerly thought,² have been the father of Idiotes son of Theogenes of Acharnai, who was an amphiktyon at Delos in 376/5; this man's unique name ('Individual') looks like a political advertisement on his father's part: just as Pylilampes by calling his son Demos proclaimed his devotion to democracy, so Theogenes by calling his son Idiotes proclaimed his devotion to the interests of the ordinary unpolitical man. This may to some extent confirm the suggestion of MacDowell³ that Theogenes was a political opponent of Kleon's and was appointed with him to discover the true state of affairs at Pylos (Thuc. 4. 27. 3) for that reason; for Kleon-Paphlagon says in *Knights* (776) that when he was a councillor he made much money for the treasury by his extortions, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδενός, εἰ σοὶ [sc. τῷ Δήμῳ] χαριοίμην. That is unlikely to be how the real Kleon would have put it, but it might well have been said by his opponents; no doubt by 'individuals' they meant first and foremost rich people (cf. *Eq.* 261–5), who they alleged were systematically harried by Kleon with threats of fines and confiscations.

(21) ἐγὼ δὲ τεθεώρηκα πῶποτ' οὐδαμοῖ 1188
οὐδαμοῖ Bekker: οὐδαμοῦ codd.

It is customary, since van Herwerden, to insert a question mark after πῶποτ', presumably on the assumption that πῶποτ' οὐδαμοῖ will otherwise stand in the wrong order. The resulting rhetorical question, however ('But have I ever been a θεωρός?'), is rather unnatural, and moreover we should expect the answer 'never' rather than 'nowhere'. There is in fact no objection to taking πῶποτ' οὐδαμοῖ together as = 'never anywhere'; cf. *Ra.* 1308, *Eur. Alk.* 198 (ποτε οὐ = 'never') and also *Hdt.* 8. 119 (μίαν οὐκ = 'not one'). Philokleon, urged to tell the story of his θεωρία as colleague of Androkles and Kleisthenes, rejoins 'But I've never *been* a θεωρός anywhere, except to Paros at two obols a day.'

(22) τουτὶ μὲν ἐπιεκῶς σύ γ' ἐξεπίστασαι. 1249

MacDowell and Dover⁴ take the view that this commendation of Philokleon's efforts in the song-capping game is inconsistent with the alleged condemnation of similar efforts at 1228. I do not wish to deny that there are many inconsistencies in Aristophanes; but there is not one here, because Bdelykleon has never condemned Philokleon's performances in this game. His words in 1228–30 are:

τουτὶ σὺ δράσεις; παραπολεῖ βούμενος·
φήσει γὰρ ἐξολεῖν σε καὶ διαφθερεῖν
κάκ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς ἐξελάν.

¹ λέγεται ὅτι μεγαλέμπορος τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι (schol. *Av.* 822).

² e.g. by J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* (Berlin, 1901–3); our Theogenes is

no. 6703, Idiotes 7445.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp.234–5.

⁴ K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (London, 1972), p.61.

'Is that what you'll do? You'll be shouted to death; for he [Kleon] will say that he'll destroy you and ruin you and drive you from this land.' It is not that Philokleon is playing the game badly; he is playing it dangerously, with such an opponent as Kleon. Philokleon's second and third efforts (1232–5, 1241–2) are passed by Bdelykleon without comment, and after the fourth it is evident even to the sceptical Bdelykleon that Philokleon has got the hang of the game. Whatever else Philokleon may bungle, at this game he is quite brilliant—as he subsequently proves himself to be at the game of 'comparisons' (1311–13): he is always first-rate at anything that calls only for ingenuity.

(23)	πολλάκις δὴ 'δοξ' ἔμαντῶ δεξιὸς πεφυκέναι καὶ σκαῖός οὐδεπώποτε· ἀλλ' Ἀμυνίας ὁ Σέλλου μᾶλλον, οὐκ τῶν Κρωβύλου, οὗτος ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ποτ' εἶδον ἀντὶ μήλου καὶ ῥοᾶς δειπ- νοῦντα μετὰ Λεωγόρου· πει- νῇ γὰρ ἤπερ Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ πρεσβεύων γὰρ εἰς Φάρσαλον ὥχεται, εἶτ' ἐκεῖ μόνος μόνοισι τοῖς Πενέσταισι ξυνῆν τοῖς Θετταλῶν, αὐτὸς πενέστης ὦν ἐλάττων οὐδενός.	1265 1270 1274
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MacDowell and others, ultimately following the scholia (*προσληπτέον τὸ σκαῖός μοι ἔδοξε*, sc. with *μᾶλλον*), take the sequence of thought to be: I've often thought I was clever and never that I was stupid; rather I thought that Amynias was stupid because he was so poor; but he's not so stupid after all, because he's found some people he can associate with in the shape of the Thessalian Penestai. There are some difficulties in this interpretation. Thus when Amynias is said 'at one time, instead of an apple and a pomegranate, to have dined with Leogoras', we have to understand that the dinner with Leogoras came first and the apple and pomegranate later, after Amynias became poor; which is contrary to the usual implication of *ἀντί* where it connotes temporal succession.¹ Further, in order to account for 1270, it has to be assumed, without other evidence, that Antiphon was either poor or notoriously voracious. These difficulties may be enough to make us ask whether, after all, Amynias may be being described in 1267–70 not as stupid but as clever (understanding *δεξιὸς πέφυκεν* with *μᾶλλον*). To be sure, as MacDowell says, 'hunger and poverty . . . cannot be evidence of cleverness'; but it may well be evidence of cleverness for a poor man to contrive to dine at the table of the gourmand² Leogoras; and as for hunger, it is not unlikely that 'he's as hungry as Antiphon' means 'he's not hungry at all', just as in *Ach.* 120 *τοιόνδε . . . τὸν πῶγων* ἔχων (said of Kleisthenes, for whom cf. *Eq.* 1374, *Thesm.* 583, etc.) means 'having no beard'.

¹ In the nine other Aristophanic passages where 'A *ἀντὶ* B' is used in this sense of succession (*Nu.* 381, 796; *V.* 509, 878, 1404; *Lys.* 1155; *Ra.* 694; *Pl.* 634; fr. 569. 15), A always refers to the later state of affairs, B to the earlier; and I have not found any passage anywhere where this relation is reversed. In the present passage A is 'dining with Leogoras', B 'an apple and a pomegranate'.

² Plato com., fr. 106, couples Leogoras with Morychos and Glauketes, for whom cf. *Ach.* 887, *Pax* 1008, *Thesm.* 1033.

So this strophe can be understood thus: 'I've often thought myself clever and never stupid; but Amynias is even more so, because in spite of his poverty he manages to be no hungrier than a rich man like Antiphon—I've seen him forgo his apple and pomegranate to dine with Leogoras. And yet <that's nothing>, for¹ he has now given an even more signal proof of his cleverness by finding a place to which a poor man is the ideal ambassador.' The treatment of Amynias is thus sarcastic from the start, not merely from 1271 on.

(24) Lines 1280–3 are devoted to Aripbrates and his sexual tastes ('tastes' in his case being the *mot juste*), of which we also hear in *Eq.* 1280–9 and *Pax* 883–5.² The editors note that an Aripbrates is mentioned by Aristotle (*Poet.* 1458^b 31) as a comic poet; they do not note that there is virtual proof that this is the man in question here. It is not just that it would not be surprising if the brother of a kitharode (1278, *Eq.* 1278–9) and an actor (1279) had a musical or dramatic occupation; the decisive evidence is the word γλωττοποιεῖν in 1283. The word refers to cunnilingus, but it is a great strain on language to describe this as 'making tongues'; and as so often in Aristophanes, the strain on language would seem to be due to a pun—on γελωτοποιεῖν 'to raise laughter'. Thus for a moment it seems as if Aripbrates is being called a born comedian; then, as the line continues with εἰς τὰ πορνεῖ' εἰσιόνθ', it becomes clear that he is being called a born pervert.

(25) καίτοι παρῆν Ἴππυλλος, Ἀντιφῶν, Λύκων, 1301
Λυσίστρατος, Θούραστος, οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον.

MacDowell is right to be sceptical of the view that the persons named as attending Philoktemon's party were the members of an oligarchic *ἐταιρεία*. Quite apart from anything else, their supposed leader, Phrynichos, is named by Lysias (25. 9) as a demagogue who became an oligarch, his name actually standing before that of Peisandros in this connection. But we can go further: there is in fact no evidence that Hippylos, Antiphon, Lykon, Lysistratos, and Theophrastos belonged to a single 'set' at all, even one 'whose purpose in meeting was more social than political'. Such an interpretation depends on the phrase οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον being taken as *in apposition* to the list of names preceding it; and it is as natural, or more natural, to take the phrase as *the sixth item* of the list, which would imply that the five individuals named were *not* members of 'Phrynichos' set'. If οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον had been placed first instead of last, or if πάντες had been added, the appositional interpretation would have been favoured; but as it is, the upshot is that though we know that Phrynichos was around 422 the leading figure in a well-known coterie, we do not know who its

¹ The normal meaning of ἀλλὰ . . . γάρ ('aber das tut nichts: denn . . .', J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*² (Oxford, 1954), p.101, following Wilamowitz).

² And probably also in fr. 63 (from *Anagyros*), where the speaker is afraid lest Aripbrates τὰ πράγματα ἡμῶν διακναίῃ: it is tempting to suggest that the speaker is a prostitute, that *πράγμα* here denotes the female, as elsewhere the male, genitals (cf. p.261 and n. 1), and that she is worried about Aripbrates scratching her with his moustache (just as contrariwise, in *Eq.* 1286, Aripbrates' sexual activities are said to result

in his dirtying his moustache). Some confirmation that a prostitute was a character in *Anagyros* may come from fr. 44, in which she *might* be naming her fee (with *πράττω* = 'demand payments'):

A. τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρᾶττω, δὲ ὀβολῶ καὶ
σύμβολον

ὅπῳ τῶν πικλίντρῳ.

B. μὲν τις αὐτ' ἀνείλετο;
Speaker B is wondering why A insists on the money being put under the headrest of the bed; is it because a client once stole it back from her (cf. *Ra.* 148)?

members were. To Aristophanes' audience, who knew the persons involved and their relationships, the couplet would not have been ambiguous; but to us, on presently available evidence, it is irresolubly so.

(26) Φι. ἄνεχε, πάρεχε. 1326

I have little doubt that *πάρεχε* means 'make way'; but MacDowell's translation of *ἄνεχε* as 'stand up' is surprising, since nobody would be likely to be sitting or lying on the ground in the middle of the street; nor is there any sign that anyone is sitting down in the parallel passages Eur. *Tro.* 308, *Kykl.* 203. A more likely meaning (if indeed there is much point in looking for precise meanings in doublets of this kind) is 'stop' (cf. L.S.J. s.v. *ἀνέχω* B 4–5), addressed to anyone who may be about to cross the speaker's path.

(27) οἴμ', ὥς ἀπολεῖς αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι κανθάροις. 1449

sic codd. (sed τοῖς, quod correxit Triclinius): ἀπολῶ σ'

Reiske: ἀπολεῖς με (malim σὺ) τοῖσι σοῖσι Blaydes

MacDowell rightly rejects Reiske's once popular conjecture, but he does not show that *αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι* can stand in this context. The expression 'A αὐτῷ (αὐτοῖς etc.) B' means 'A, not by itself but together with B';¹ and 'you'll be the death of me, not by yourself but together with your beetles', it makes sense at all, has the surely unwanted implication that Bdelykleon would not find his father intolerable were it not for his mention of beetles (1448). Blaydes's neglected conjecture gives exactly the sense wanted, though I have suggested how it might be brought closer to the manuscripts' text. For *τοῖσι σοῖσι κανθάροις* cf. *τὸν σὸν οἶνον* (1393); here, as there, Bdelykleon is being unfair, for neither the wine nor the beetles were Philokleon's idea originally; on the contrary, it was Bdelykleon himself who advised an unwilling Philokleon to drink (1252) and to get out of trouble by telling 'Aesopic' stories (1259), of which that of the beetle and the eagle was one of the most famous.

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¹ Cf. the following passages (which are, I think, all those in the three tragedians and Aristophanes in which this idiom is used): Aesch. *Prom.* 221, 1047; Soph. *Aj.* 27; Eur. *Kykl.* 705, *Med.* 164, *Hipp.* 1341, *Supp.* 927, *Herakles* 1306, *Tro.* 986, *Or.* 1515, *Ba.* 946,

1134; Ar. *Eq.* 3, 7, 849, *Nu.* 1302, *V.* 119, 170, *Pax* 1288, *Av.* 1257, *Thesm.* 825, *Ra.* 226, 476, 560, *Eccl.* 691; Ar. fr. 287 is of obscure meaning, but gives no sign of conflicting with the generalization in the text.